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Crossing the Border: 
Self-Selection, Earnings and Individual Migration Decisions
* 
 
Many empirical studies on the determinants of international migration flows rely exclusively 
on macro data, and do not account for migrants’ self-selection. We analyze a very interesting 
episode in international migration for which we are able to gather individual-level data 
covering all relevant countries, namely the exodus of Ecuadorians to Spain and the US in the 
aftermath of the economic collapse of 1999. Specifically, we produce selection-corrected 
predictions of counterfactual individual earnings and use them to estimate a discrete-choice 
migration equation that allows for correlated errors across destinations and a rich structure of 
migration costs. We find that earnings significantly shape individual migration decisions, even 
in an episode in which Ecuadorians mostly chose Spain where earnings were lower than in 
the US, and they contribute to explaining the observed composition of migration flows. 
Moreover, our estimates show that changes in earnings at a particular destination have a 
larger effect on destination choice conditional on migration than on the scale of migration. 
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Why do people move across borders? And, in particular, what is the role of income dierences
in determining international migration ows? This is a simple yet challenging question,
going back to Sjaastad (1962). Estimating the role of income in migration decisions requires
predicting the earnings individuals can obtain at all alternative locations. But, of course,
each individual is only observed in one single location.
A number of recent inuential studies have made important contributions toward under-
standing the role of income in accounting for bilateral migration ows (Grogger and Hanson
(2008), Belot and Hatton (2008), Ortega and Peri (2009), among several others). These
studies typically use solely aggregate data, so that country-wide average income gures -
specically, GDP per capita - are used to proxy potential migrants' earnings at destination.
This choice - which is severely constrained by data availability - implicitly rests on two as-
sumptions, namely that destination countries do not dier as far as the transferability of
migrants' skill is concerned, and that there are no individual-specic unobserved factors that
simultaneously inuence earnings and the decision to migrate. Still, none of these two as-
sumptions is fully consistent with the ndings of the empirical literature on the assimilation
of the immigrants (see Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985)), and the theoretical insights on
migrants' self-selection (see Roy (1951), Sjaastad (1962) or Borjas (1987)).
On the other hand, the internal migration literature (e.g. Dahl (2002); Bayer, Keohane,
and Timmins (2009); Kennan and Walker (2009)) employs individual-level data. It is a well-
established fact in the internal migration literature that failing to account for unobserved
ability or any other factor that aects simultaneously the migration decision and expected
earnings can represent a critical source of bias.
Our contribution is the estimation of an international migration model using individual-
level earnings data coming from dierent countries and sources. The model allows for unob-
served individual-specic factors inuencing both earnings and migration decisions, as in the
Roy-Borjas model. In the estimation of the earnings equation, we control for self-selection
using state-of-the-art techniques (Dahl (2002)) from the internal migration literature. In the
estimation of the migration decision, while controlling for a rich structure of migration costs,
we relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption, so that migration decisions
do not respond to changes in earnings dierentials but dierentially to changes in earnings
in the various locations.
3This approach is used to analyze a recent major migration episode, namely the wave of
Ecuadorian migration which was triggered by the late 1990s economic crisis, when approxi-
mately 600,000 individuals left from a country with a population of 12.7 million over a few
years (1999-2005). This migration episode also oers the chance to address a key challenge,
the one represented by data requirements, as recent Ecuadorian migrants moved towards
just two main destinations: the US and Spain. We merge information on Ecuadorians con-
tained in three comparable household surveys collected in Ecuador, the National Survey on
Employment and Unemployment in the Rural and Urban Areas 2005 (ENEMDU 2005), the
US, the American Community Survey 2007 (ACS 2007), and Spain, the National Immigrant
Survey 2007 (ENI 2007).
This particular international emigration episode is also interesting for another reason.
Namely, the number of Ecuadorians that migrated to Spain over our period of interest
was roughly three times larger than the corresponding ow to the US (Table 1). This is
puzzling given the large dierence in per capita incomes between the two destinations1 and
the existence of pre-crisis Ecuadorian migration networks in the US but not in Spain (Jokisch
and Pribilsky (2002)). Thus this episode poses a challenging test for any income-maximizing
theory of migration.
Our main result is that earnings dierences were relevant determinants of the decision
to migrate, even in an episode where most migrants preferred a lower income destination
(Spain) over a higher income one (the US). The estimates also show that changes in earnings
at a particular destination have a larger eect on destination choice conditional on migration
than on the scale of migration. In terms of our model, the reason for this pattern is that
migrants tend to have above-average propensities to migrate. As a result their choices are
more sensitive to changes in earnings at a particular destination than those of the average
stayer, characterized by a low propensity to migrate.
Our econometric analysis conrms the empirical relevance of the argument that unob-
served individual specic factors need to be adequately addressed in the choice of the estima-
tion procedure. The application of the selection-control procedure proposed by Dahl (2002)
demonstrates that the non-random selection in unobservables biases the counterfactual in-
comes that we would obtain from simple Mincerian regressions, and this would consequently
1The 2006 GDP per capita in PPP US Dollars was 44,000 in the US, 29,000 in Spain and 7,000 in Ecuador
(World Bank (2008)).
4bias the estimation of the migration decision model. Reassuringly, in this particular case,
the bias is not excessively large.
The time-equivalent implicit migration costs that we recover from the model imply that
the cost of moving to the US is several times larger than the corresponding cost of going
to Spain. This dierence could be related to the cultural and linguistic proximity between
Ecuador and Spain, and to the relatively more generous Spanish welfare state. We pro-
vide suggestive evidence showing that the eects of the progressive tightening of the US
immigration policies, which began in the mid 1990s together with the relatively lax Spanish
immigration policy towards Ecuadorians (at least until August 2003) also contributed to
shape the pattern moving costs, and policy-induced migration costs (Beine, Docquier, and
 Ozden (2009)) indeed constrained location choice. Networks, which did play a role in this
migration episode (Bertoli (2010)), probably lowered the cost of moving to the US, but their
eect is overshadowed by the inuence of the other country-specic factors described above.
The variability of migration costs across gender and educational groups is in line with the
models put forward by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) or McKenzie and Rapoport (2009).
This paper is related to several strands of research. It is most relevant in terms of the
recent work on the determinants of international migration ows, such as Grogger and Han-
son (2008), Belot and Hatton (2008), Ortega and Peri (2009), Mayda (2008), Pedersen,
Pytlikova, and Smith (2006) and Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2007). As noted earlier,
all these studies rely on aggregate data. In our use of individual earnings data for dier-
ent countries, our work is in the vein of Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) who
report wages of comparable workers with the same nationalities across dierent destination
countries, and Batista (2008) who controls for unobserved heterogeneity when estimating
individual-level counterfactual wages. Neither of these two studies estimates a migration
decision equation. Our paper is also related to other studies in the international migra-
tion literature that use micro data.Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), McKenzie and Rapoport
(2009) or Fern andez-Huertas Moraga (2009) study Mexico-US migration but are not con-
cerned about the income-sensitivity of migration. Hanson and McIntosh (2008) also deal with
Mexican emigration to the US and assess the factors behind long-run trends in the ows,
establishing the relevance of labor supply shocks. Their work is extended to Latin American
emigration in general in Hanson and McIntosh (2009). One of the channels through which
labor supply shocks could be operating are wages in origin countries so this could be seen as
5one of the deep causes of our results.
Methodologically, our study is related to the research on the determinants of internal
migration. Some inuential contributions are Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980), Falaris (1987),
Falaris (1988) and, more recently, Dahl (2002), Kennan and Walker (2009)) and Bayer,
Keohane, and Timmins (2009). In their attention to self-selection, these studies are also
related to the large literature on selection-correction methods (Heckman (1979), Lee (1983),
Dubin and McFadden (1984), Dahl (2002), Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007),
Bayer, Khan, and Timmins (2008), or Hamermesh and Donald (2008) among many others).
Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature that analyzes the Ecuadorian migration
episode and the crisis that generated it. Some relevant papers in this area are: Jokisch
and Pribilsky (2002), Bertoli (2010), Gratton (2007), J acome (2004) or Bertoli, Fern andez-
Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (2010).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple migration
decision model. Section 3 outlines an estimation approach that is consistent with our un-
derlying theoretical model. Section 4 briey sketches the salient features and the economic
determinants of the Ecuadorian migration that followed the 1999 crisis. Section 5 describes
the data sources that we draw upon to build our joint dataset, and it presents the rele-
vant descriptive statistics. Then, Section 6 deals with the implementation of the estimation
methodology, and Section 7 discusses the results from our individual-level estimation of the
income responsiveness of international migration decisions and it analyzes the pattern of the
implicit migration costs that can be recovered from the estimates of our model. Finally,
Section 8 concludes. All gures and tables are collected at the end of the paper.
2 The Model
We consider the following version of the Roy (1951) migration model. All individuals start
out in location j = 1. Each individual chooses whether to migrate to one of either two
potential destinations (j = 2;3). Observing all relevant variables, each individual compares
the utility from migrating to each destination with the utility from staying in the location
of origin, and then opts for the utility-maximizing alternative. From the point of view of
the econometrician, individuals dier both in observable and unobservable characteristics.
Crucially, part of the latter aects both the decision to migrate and the realization of earnings
6at destination. More formally, our empirical model has two inter-related equations: a discrete
migration-choice equation (1) and a wage equation (2). That is, for each location j = 1;2;3,
Uij = Vij + v
m
ij = wij + x
0









ij + (ji + "
w
ij): (2)
In equation (1), the dependent variable is the latent utility that individual i attaches to
location j. Utility includes a deterministic component (Vij), which depends on the log of
labor earnings at that location (wij) and on a vector of individual characteristics (xi), and
an unobserved stochastic component vm
ij. This is the sum of an individual-specic term (i)
and an individual-location-specic shock ("m
ij). vm
ij captures all the variables that are relevant
to the decision-maker but are unknown to the econometrician. For instance, "m
ij will be high
for individuals that have relatives already living in destination j.2 We assume that 1 = 0
whereas j  0 for j = 2;3. Under these assumptions it is natural to interpret i as the
unobserved individual propensity to migrate.3 Equation (2) species individual log wages in
each location as a function of observable (zi) and unobservable characteristics (i and "w
ij).
Importantly, we allow for the propensity to migrate (i) to aect also wages.4 Following
Grogger and Hanson (2008), we will also experiment with specications featuring wages in
levels in our empirical analysis of equation (1).
To complete the description of the model we turn to the stochastic specication. We as-
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for j = 2;3. We also assume that the covariate vectors
(xi and zi) are uncorrelated with "m
ij and "w
ij.
Individual unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity to migrate has two important
implications. First, it generates a nested structure. Namely, it causes the unobservable
component in the migration equation (vm
ij) to be correlated across destinations, for a given
2Alternatively, term "m
ij can be interpreted as the level of uency of the individual in the language
spoken in destination j or the degree of transferability of his human capital although the average degree of
transferability of human capital can also be counted as a part of j.




4We normalize 1 = 0. Note that if j and j are positive for both destinations then high-i individuals
will be both more likely to migrate and to obtain above-average earnings at destination.
7individual. Meanwhile, under our assumptions, there is no correlation between the error












ij) = 0 j = 2;3 (4)
Secondly, unobserved heterogeneity introduces a selection bias in the estimation of the wage
equation. Namely, migrants are not a random sample of the original population. That is,
they will tend to have systematically high or low wage draws. For example, suppose that
i is a measure of risk aversion. Less risk averse individuals will be more likely to migrate.
At the same time, they will be more likely to self-select into more risky jobs, which should
oer a risk premium over the wage in non-risky jobs. This selection bias has important
practical implications. Naturally, in our data we only observe labor earnings in one location
for each individual. Thus, the estimation of the determinants of migration choices (equation
(1)) requires generating counterfactual earnings for the other locations. This needs to be
done in a way that accounts for self-selection into migration. In the context of international
migration, this is the key innovation of the exercise we carry out in the following sections.
Let us briey discuss the sources of identication in our approach. The wage regression
is essentially a standard Mincer regression that accounts for self-selection into migration,
where the coecients are identied from individual variation in each location. Turning to
the migration equation, the wage coecient () is identied from individual variation both
within and between locations. In contrast, in studies using only macro data, the identication
is purely based on the correlation between the proportion of migrants and average per capita
incomes across destinations. As a result, the estimate of the earnings coecient may suer
from omitted variable bias. It is easy to think of omitted country characteristics, such as
the quality of public services or natives' attitudes toward immigrants, that are correlated
with income per capita and aect the attractiveness of a location. In contrast, equation (1)
includes country-specic intercepts that account for all such factors.
Finally, it is well known that, in random utility models, not all the coecients on the
individual-specic characteristics in the migration equation are identied. We follow the
convention of normalizing the coecients of the original location to zero, that is, 1 = 0. The
coecients on the variables that are not location-specic need to be interpreted as relative to
their eect on the normalizing location (the origin country in this case). Thus, we interpret
x0
ij (for j = 2;3) as the net gain from migration to a particular destination. Obviously,
8 x0
ij can be interpreted as the net cost of migration to destination j = 2;3. In our
application these net costs of migration will vary at the individual level, reecting dierences
in gender, age, education, marital status and household composition. Identication of the
terms in the variance-covariance matrix of the migration equation depends on the stochastic
specication of the model, which we discuss further in the next section.
3 Estimation
As noted already, unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity to migrate aecting also earn-
ings has two important consequences for estimation: it creates a selection bias in the wage
equation and it introduces correlation across the error terms of the location equation. Typ-
ically, due to data constraints, the versions of the Roy model that are estimated in the
literature on international migration are special cases of the model above. In particular,
researchers commonly assume that the unobserved terms in the latent utility equation (vm
ij)
are independent across locations (Grogger and Hanson (2008)). In the context of our specic
model, this amounts to assuming that i = 0 for all i. Note that under this (strong) assump-
tion our model would not display a self-selection problem in the wage equation. Namely,
it would be appropriate to assign to migrants a counterfactual wage had they not migrated
equal to the average wage among non-migrants with the same observable characteristics.
This approach is in stark contrast to the industry standard in the literature on internal mi-
gration, where several studies have argued forcefully against ignoring individual unobserved
heterogeneity in propensities to migrate correlated with the wage generating process. The
richer data available to study internal migration ows has led researchers to develop tech-
niques to estimate versions of the Roy model where self-selection into migration is taken into
account (Dahl (2002), Kennan and Walker (2009) or Bayer, Khan, and Timmins (2008),
among others).
The key contribution of our paper is to identify an important international migration
episode for which we are able to assemble high-quality individual-level data for migrants
and non-migrants, covering all the relevant destinations. We are then able to apply the
methods developed in the internal migration literature to estimate the model presented in
the previous section.
As noted earlier, we need to tackle two main challenges. First, the error terms in the mi-
9gration equation may be correlated across alternatives.5 As a result, estimating a conditional
logit model would not be appropriate. Instead the particular correlation structure in equa-
tions (3) and (4) nicely ts the structure of the nested logit model (MacFadden (1978)).6
There is yet a second challenge in the estimation of the model: our modeled unobserved
heterogeneity (i in particular) introduces a selection problem in the wage equation. The
observed sample of individuals in a given destination may not be a random sample of the
population of origin. Migrants will tend to have high migration propensities to that destina-
tion, which may systematically bias their wage draws. As a result, the estimated coecient
on the impact of income on migration () is likely to be biased. Moreover, we use data on
actual earnings of migrants, which requires fewer imputation assumptions that are typically
made in the international migration literature, where natives' income or GDP per capita are
frequently used.
Our estimation of the system of equations (1) and (2) is done in two stages. First,
we estimate individual, location-specic after-tax earnings correcting for self-selection using
the method in Dahl (2002). We use these estimates to produce counterfactual earnings in
each location for each individual. Second, we estimate the discrete location-choice equation
(1). The observable part of the utility associated to each location is based on the earnings
predictions computed in the rst stage, as well as a number of individual controls. We
make distributional assumptions that lead to a random-utility nested logit model. This
model takes into account the discrete nature of the location choice in our environment
(three locations) and it is able to accommodate the structure of correlations generated by
our modeled unobserved heterogeneity in individual propensities to migrate. We bootstrap
standard errors to account for the two-stage estimation procedure.
We next provide some further details on our estimation method. Let us start with the self-
selection problem in the wage equation. We apply the correction proposed by Dahl (2002)
with a small modication. First, we divide the population into mutually exclusive cells
dened by observable characteristics: age, education, gender, marital status, and household
5This implies that independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) fails.
6A multinomial probit would be an alternative estimation method that is consistent with our model; in
our three-location model the two methods are likely to deliver very similar results because of the similarity
of their variance-covariance matrices. The nested logit has the advantage of closed-form expressions for
the choice probabilities, which prove very useful in providing intuition for the magnitudes implied by the
estimated coecients
10size. Second, for each cell, we compute the proportion of individuals that chose to stay
and work in the home country (j = 1) and the proportions that chose to migrate to each
destination and work for a wage there (j = 2;3). Here is where we slightly depart from Dahl
(2002). While he limits his study to working-male individuals and disregards the issue of
selection into employment, we decide not to restrict our sample and consider selection into
employment and selection into migration jointly, following the discussion in Hamermesh and
Donald (2008). Thus, we estimate the following selection-corrected earnings equation:
wij = z
0
ij + fj(pij) + "
w
ij (5)
where the new term fj(pij) is a polynomial function of the probability that an individual
i chooses location j and decides to work for a wage there, calculated as the proportion of
individuals with observable characteristics in the same cell that chose to live and work in
location j. Intuitively, this polynomial term corrects for the fact that employed migrants
to a particular destination have a higher unobserved propensity to migrate and work, which
may also inuence their earnings realization. The assumption behind Dahl's method is that
unobservable heterogeneity within cells is relatively small.7
Once we obtain selection-corrected individual wages, we turn to the second stage: the
discrete choice migration problem. Our model can be estimated with a nested logit model
once we assume that the individual-location-specic shock ("m
ij) in equation (1) follows an
Extreme Value Type-I distribution because this implies that the whole error term (vm
ij) follows
a Generalized Extreme Value distribution. Specically, we partition the three locations into
two nests: a singleton containing only the home country (1) and a duple with the two
potential destinations (2 and 3). The nested logit allows for positive correlation within nests
but imposes zero correlation across nests, which is precisely the correlation structure of our
model.
The parameters to be estimated are coecients vectors  and  together with the dis-
similarity coecient , which controls the degree of correlation between the idiosyncratic
7Note that the correction term is indexed by j. Thus, here we are allowing for the degree of selection
to vary by destination. The correction has been shown to be more ecient when including a higher order
polynomial, containing also the proportions of individuals in the other locations. We follow this approach.
Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007) compare Dahl's estimation procedure with others previously
developed and widely used by the literature: Lee (1983) and Dubin and McFadden (1984). They conclude
that Dahl's and their own variant of Dubin and McFadden (1984) are preferable to Lee's method.
11shocks of the two alternatives in the non-trivial nest, vm
i2;vm






















Coecient  is important for two reasons. First, when  = 1, i.e. vm
i2;vm
i3 = 0, the model
collapses to the standard conditional logit model. Second, the value of  determines whether
the estimated model is consistent with utility maximization or not8.
A great advantage of the nested logit model is that it delivers closed-form solutions for
the choice probabilities. It is easy to show that
p1 =
eV1





eV1 + (eV2= + eV3=)

eVj=
eV2= + eV3= j = 2;3 (9)
These expressions are quite intuitive. Equation (8) characterizes the probability of staying
in the country of origin (location j = 1). This expression is a function of the expected
utility associated to staying in the country relative to the expected utility from migration,
which is an aggregate of the expected utilities in each possible destination. We note that
the latter aggregation is a function of the dissimilarity parameter . When  = 1, all
locations are treated symmetrically. Regarding equation (9), the two terms on the right-
hand side correspond to the probability of migrating (to j = 2 or 3) times the probability
of choosing destination j, conditional on migration. Clearly, an increase in, say, V2 increases
the probability of choosing that destination both because it increases the migration rate and
because it makes destination 2 more attractive relative to destination 3.
4 The Ecuadorian Crisis
We now discuss the nature of the Ecuadorian exodus, which was mainly directed to the
US and Spain. Ecuador was hit by a major economic and nancial crisis at the end of
8Daly and Zachary (1979) and MacFadden (1978). B orsch-Supan (1990), Herriges and Kling (1996),
Koning and Ridder (2003) and Ib a~ nez (2006), among others, establish dierent sets of conditions for the
estimates of the parameters of a nested logit model to be consistent with utility maximization. In all of
them, a dissimilarity parameter in the interval (0;1] is a sucient condition.
12the 1990s, induced by a remarkable series of adverse shocks. The price of oil, which still
represents the single largest revenue item in the Balance of Payments and a crucial scal
resource, reached a historical low in 1998. In the same year, the coastal provinces suered
from the oods induced by El Ni~ no rains, which caused major infrastructure disruptions and
severely hurt the agricultural sector, with a $2.6 billion estimated damage, representing 13
percent of GDP (IMF (2000)). These factors compounded the macroeconomic instability
existing in the country, and led to the collapse of the domestic currency, the sucre, and to a
large-scale banking crisis. The Ecuadorian economic system was already de facto dollarized
(J acome (2004)), and the depreciation of the Sucre impaired the ability of the debtors to
pay back the dollar denominated loans they had received, thus seriously deteriorating the
balance sheets of domestic banks. Notwithstanding huge injections of liquidity on the side
of the Ecuadorian Central Bank and the introduction of a public blanket guarantee of all
deposits, the fears of a widespread banking crisis mounted, and the government decided to
freeze bank accounts in March 1999, in a desperate attempt to prevent a bank run. By the
end of the year, Ecuador was experiencing a 2-digit monthly rate of ination, and its real
GDP per capita had declined by 7.6 percent (see Figure 1).
The government decided to adopt the dollar as a legal tender of exchange in January
2000 to avoid the incipient risk of hyperination, and to try to revive credit operations at a
time when 16 out of 36 domestic banks had already been closed or had gone under public
stewardship (J acome (2004)). Dollarization was implemented at a markedly undervalued
conversion rate, as the decision to dollarize had not been agreed upon with international
nancial institutions, so that the Central Bank had to buy back the domestic monetary
base with its limited holdings of foreign reserves. This induced a massive \once-and-for-
all price-level adjustment" (Beckerman and Cort es-Douglas (2002)), as the consumer price
index rose by 96 percent in 2000, and it thus imposed a heavy toll on real wages. As Figure
1 shows, Ecuador experienced a moderately positive rate of growth in per capita GDP in
2000, which strengthened after 2001, when dollarization began to produce benecial eects
on price stability. Despite the incipient economic recovery, the crisis had produced some
long lasting eects on Ecuadorian households. High ination had substantially eroded the
real value of their savings, and a large share of payments to depositors in failed banks were
still pending almost ten years after the crisis (Laeven and Valencia (2008)), the government
guarantees notwithstanding.
13The 1999 crisis triggered an unprecedented wave of international migration out of Ecuador,
with approximately 600,000 individuals leaving over the 1999-2005 period (Ram rez Galle-
gos and Ram rez (2005); Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (2010)), from a
country with a total population of 12.7 million, according to the 2001 Population Census.
Crucially for our analysis, Ecuadorian migrants ocked essentially to only two main destina-
tions. Based on our estimates, the US and Spain absorbed 80 to 90 percent of the Ecuadorian
migration induced by the crisis.9 Figures 2 and 3 report inows of Ecuadorians into the US
and Spain on an annual basis. Clearly, inows surged between 1999 and 2003. Around 2004
ows into both countries were back to the respective pre-crisis levels. Interestingly, although
the timing of migration ows is similar to both destinations, the size of the ows diers sub-
stantially. The Ecuadorian population in the US increased from 272,000 individuals before
the crisis (2000 US Census) to 394,000 in 2005 (ACS 2007). In comparison, over the same
period Ecuadorian inows to Spain were three times as large. Specically, the Ecuadorian
population in Spain grew from 76,000 (2001 Spain Census) to 457,000 individuals (2005 Local
Population Registry). The sudden economic collapse and the resulting surge in Ecuadorian
migration at the time of the economic crisis is an important feature for our analysis. It pro-
vides an unusually clean \push shock", and it also justies treating education as exogenous
with respect to the prospect to migrate at the time of the shock.
5 Data
5.1 Data sources
Our analysis requires individual-level data for the three countries over our period of interest.
We describe below the three sources that we use to create our combined dataset. For Spain,
we rely on the National Immigrant Survey (or ENI in the Spanish acronym), which was
conducted in 2007 on a sample of 15,500 foreign-born residents in Spain. The survey covers
both the legal and the undocumented foreign-born population and it is the rst nationally
representative immigrant survey conducted in Spain. The timing of the Spanish survey ts
well with the need to focus on the Ecuadorian migrants who left over the 1999-2005 period,
as it is well known that immigrant surveys have trouble to adequately account for very recent
arrivals. For the US, we use the 2007 American Community Survey (ACS 2007). Its sample
9Estimates based on the 2001 Ecuador Census and the ENEMDU 2005.
14is approximately 2.5 percent of the resident population in the US. For Ecuador we choose
the December 2005 round of the National Survey on Employment and Unemployment in
the Rural and Urban Areas (or ENEMDU in the Spanish acronym). This is a nationally
representative labor market survey that is conducted once a year.
We merge the three datasets, appropriately weighted. Our merged dataset contains
information on age, gender, marital status, household size, education, years since migration,
employment status, occupation, and labor earnings. Our sample is limited to all individuals
who were born in Ecuador between 1949 and 1982, and (when they did so) left Ecuador
between 1999 and 2005, our reference period. These individuals were between 16 and 49
years old and living in Ecuador in 1998, at the onset of the migration episode. This age
restriction on the sample is common in the literature, as it covers the age group that is more
likely to migrate for economic reasons. We opted for restricting by year of birth as opposed
to age at the time of the survey to ensure that we compare migrants to stayers in the same
birth cohort. Our nal sample contains 28,122 stayers (ENEMDU 2005), 509 migrants to
the US (ACS 2007), and 949 migrants to Spain (ENI 2005).10
5.2 Descriptive statistics
Tables 1 and 2 present some basic descriptive statistics on stayers and migrants to the two
destinations. First, Table 1 provides estimates of the magnitude of the emigration ows by
gender and educational status. Overall, the emigration ow represented approximately 6
percent of the total Ecuadorian population in our sample. Thus, the ow was very large in
relative terms following the economic collapse and this can be considered as a huge inter-
national migration episode. Still, 94 percent of the population chose to remain in Ecuador.
This suggests that migration costs are likely to have been very high in the aftermath of
the crisis. Turning now to the destinations chosen by migrants, we note that the migration
ow to Spain was three times larger than the migration ow to the US, with the proportion
being higher among females and non-college graduates. As we next show, labor earnings for
Ecuadorians in the US were much larger than in Spain or in Ecuador. The relatively small
emigration to the US suggests that the costs to migrate to the US must have been very high,
10These gures amount to 70 percent of all Ecuadorians in the 2007 ACS and 77 percent in the 2007 ENI.
We have also experimented restricting the sample to individuals ages 25-49 in 1998. The more restricted
sample only has half of the observations.
15compared to Spain.
Table 2 shows that Ecuadorians in the US between 1999 and 2005 were predominantly
male (54 percent), whereas Ecuadorians in Spain were gender balanced (49 percent female
share). Among males, 14 percent of the Ecuadorians in the US had a college degree and
their average age was 29 years at the time of migration. In comparison, only 8 percent of
Ecuadorian males in Spain had a college degree.11 Interestingly, the share of college-educated
among Ecuadorian women was higher than among men in both destinations (22 percent in
the US and 15 percent in Spain), but still migrants to the US were more educated, on average,
than migrants to Spain. In comparison, the share of college graduates among Ecuadorians
that chose to stay in Ecuador was 14 percent for males and 13 percent for females.12
Table 2 also reports data on labor income, which are dened as pre-tax earnings over
the 12 months prior to the survey (converted to 2005 US dollars).13 Clearly, earnings were
the lowest in Ecuador and the highest in the US. For instance, Ecuadorian men earned, on
average, $3,565 in Ecuador, $15,979 in Spain, and $26,896 in the US. That is, migration to
Spain and to the US is associated, respectively, to a 4-fold and a 7-fold increase in annual
earnings in nominal terms. Naturally, the return to migration shrinks if we adjust for cost
of living dierences but it remains fairly large even then.14
Table 3 reports median annual earnings and employment rates by gender and destination.
Let us examine rst the data on employment rates. We note that employment rates for male
college graduates were very similar in the three locations (92-93 percent) and slightly higher
in Ecuador for male non-college graduates (95 compared to 90 percent).15 Instead, female
employment rates for low-educated women were higher abroad than in Ecuador: 63 percent
in the US and 81 percent in Spain, compared to 57 percent in Ecuador. For college-educated
women, the employment rate was very similar in Ecuador and in Spain (over 80 percent)
11Individuals are regarded as college graduates if they have at least 4 years of college education.
12Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (2010) analyze selection and sorting in the same dataset
controlling for other observable characteristics. The basic message is the same one that results from the
statistics shown in Table 2.
13Earnings in the ENEMDU 2005 are reported on a monthly basis, so we have annualized them for
comparability with the other sources.
14Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) also nd a 7-fold increase in nominal earnings for Ecuadorians
in the US (7.3) with dierent sample selection criteria. When they add dierent controls, this ratio is reduced
to around 4 or 5.
15Recall that the Ecuadorian data is for 2005, when the economic recovery was well under way in Ecuador.
16and lower in the US (63 percent).16 Employment rates were higher for males in all countries
but the gap was small in Spain, thanks to very high female employment rates.
Turning to the earnings data, several features stand out. First, we note again the large
migration premium for Ecuadorians that migrated to the US and to Spain. Second, the data
reveal a large and fairly constant female penalty in earnings. Across the three locations,
men earned over 40 percent more than women with comparable education levels. Third, the
college premium diered greatly across the three locations. In Ecuador, the annual earnings
of college-educated men were 2.6 times higher than the earnings of men with no college
degree (the respective gure is 2.8 for women). Ecuadorian men in the US also displayed a
handsome college premium of 42 percent (38 percent for women). Interestingly, the lowest
college premium is found among Ecuadorians in Spain. Our data suggest that college-
graduate Ecuadorian men earned the same as non-college-graduates in Spain. Similarly,
college-educated women earned only 4 percent more than Ecuadorian women without a
college degree. These gures suggest that the education credentials of Ecuadorian migrants
in Spain were often not recognized by Spanish employers.17
These dierences in college premia are not driven by dierences in length of stay in the
new destination since our sample selection criteria ensure that migrants to the US and to
Spain had been in the country roughly at the same time (6 years since migration, Table
2). Also, they are not the result of dierences in legal status of immigrants across countries
(see Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (2010)). These gures, which reect the
earnings of migrants at destination as opposed to the average earnings of the total population
in the destination country, are not in line with the pattern described by Grogger and Hanson
(2008), who document that absolute dierences in earnings between college and non-college
individuals are increasing in the income level of a country, while relative dierences are
decreasing.
Overall, these descriptive statistics suggest three conclusions. First, the earnings of the
16The lower employment rates for female Ecuadorians in the US, relative to Spain, can be probably traced
back to the larger share of tied movers among the women who migrated to the US. Jokisch and Pribilsky
(2002), S anchez (2004) and Bertoli (2010) document the importance of family reunication for Ecuadorian
migrants in the US.
17It is well known that the college premium among Spanish-born individuals in Spain is lower than, for
instance, among US-born individuals in the US. However, it is still positive and quantitatively important
(Gonz alez and Ortega (2008)).
17migrants were much higher than the earnings of the stayers, particularly for low-educated
Ecuadorians. The ratios of median earnings of male migrants relative to stayers ranged
between 6.7 (Spain) and 9.3 (US) for Ecuadorians without a college degree and from 2.6
(Spain) to 5.1 (US) for college graduates. Similar gures are obtained for women. Second,
the earnings of migrants in the US were much higher than the earnings of migrants in Spain.
Third, female employment rates in the US were much lower than female employment rates
in Spain. Thus, there is a great degree of variability in the data across destinations and
observable characteristics in terms of earnings and employment outcomes.
6 Implementation
The estimation of our model can be divided into two stages. The rst stage requires pro-
ducing individual-level estimates of earnings for each of the three locations that account for
self-selection into migration. The second stage involves the estimation of a discrete choice
migration model that allows for correlation across alternatives. Let us now provide some
detail on the implementation of the estimation of our model.
6.1 Selection-corrected individual earnings
Construction of cells. We follow the methodology in Dahl (2002).18 We build dierent
cell structures for Ecuador and for the two destination countries, to take into account the
dierent sample size in the three locations. For Ecuador, we dene 48 dierent cells, dened
by gender, education (college versus non-college), age (three age groups), marital status
(married versus non-married) and household size (larger or smaller than two individuals).
The average cell size is 586 stayers with a maximum of 2,700 and a minimum of 9. For the
US and Spain, the more limited sample size reduces the number of cells to 8, dened by
gender, education and household size. The average cell size is 178 migrants, ranging from a
minimum of 32 to a maximum of 386.19 For each of these cells, the proportion of individuals
who actually stays and works for a wage in Ecuador (^ pi1), migrates to the US and work
18As a robustness check, we replicate our estimation procedure using other standard corrections for self-
selection. The results do not change much. All these methods are available in Stata's package SELMLOG,
developed by Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007).
19Using the same cell division for migrants and stayers (either the coarser with 8 cells or the ner with 48
cells) does not aect our main results.
18for a wage there (^ pi2) or migrates to Spain and works for a wage there (^ pi3) will be used in
the next step as the predicted probability that an individual belonging to a particular cell
chooses to work in the respective location.
Identication would benet from information aecting the propensity to migrate and
work without aecting wages. We follow the literature on selection into employment and
wages (Heckman (1979)) by using household size as a variable which can arguably aect
selection into employment and migration without aecting wages directly20. In addition, we
would have liked to separate the two sources of selection: migration and employment, as
done by Hamermesh and Donald (2008), but we lack any credible information that should
appear in the selection into employment equation and not in the selection into migration
equation or viceversa. The use of the household size variable in the migration equation can
be seen as controversial, since households are likely to be measured dierently in each of our
data sources.21 To address this concern, we have re-estimated the whole procedure without
using the household size variable at all and found that results did not change signicantly.22
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where zi includes a constant, a college-graduate dummy, a female dummy, age and its
square, a marital status dummy and nine occupational dummies23. Function fj (^ pij; ^ pij0) is
Dahl's correction polynomial. The exact form is a second order polynomial in the retention
probability for stayers and a second order polynomial in the retention and rst-best prob-
ability for migrants plus an interaction term. The inclusion of occupational dummies in zi
allows us to identify the earnings coecient in the ensuing migration choice model without
fully relying on non-linear functional forms. In addition, it allows us to control for a complex
structure of migration costs (or net migration benets) correlated with our observables, such
20We checked that our results below are robust to the inclusion of the household size variable on our wage
equation directly. In that case, identication comes only from functional form.
21Bertoli (2010), following McKenzie and Rapoport (2009), provides evidence of a large incidence of whole
household migration to both the US and Spain.
22Results are available from the authors upon request.
23We use the 1-digit ISCO categories. US occupations are recoded from US OCC 2000 into ISCO-88
categories following Elliott and Gerova (2005).
19as networks, employment probabilities, migration policies in both countries, welfare state,
etc. (see the discussion below).24
The standard errors for equation (10) need to take into account the fact that cell prob-
abilities are also estimated with some error in the rst step. To this end, we produce
bootstrapped standard errors by running replications of the procedure in each of which we
randomly select observations by country of choice up to the sample size with replacement.
Prediction of individual earnings for all locations. Next, we predict earnings in all
three locations for all individuals in the sample, using the estimated equation (10).25 26
6.2 The migration choice
Using the predicted earnings from (10), we estimate a discrete choice migration model that
allows for correlation across alternatives. We can summarize it by:
Uij = Vij + v
m
ij (11)
for locations j = 1;2;3. The rst term of the right-hand side is the deterministic part
of utility while the second is an idiosyncratic stochastic component dened in equation (1).
Specically,
Vij =  ^ wij + x
0
ij (12)
The main explanatory variable for the probability of choosing a particular location is our
estimate of expected log earnings at that location ( ^ wij). This estimate takes into account that
migrants may not be a random sample of the original population, allowing for the degree of
self-selection to vary by destination. In addition, the vector of individual earnings estimates
takes into account that upon migration some individuals may be further self-selected into
employment. We include controls for all the variables that were used in the previous steps:
24Our results can be replicated without signicant changes without including occupational dummies.
25We assign the elementary occupation to non-working individuals; the results are not sensitive to dierent
assignments.
26We also experiment with an alternative strategy to predict individual earnings. Namely, one can use
actual earnings for the location that has been observed for each individual and then use predictions for the
two counterfactual locations only. This barely aects our main estimates. The results from all of these
auxiliary regressions are available from the authors upon request.
20gender, education, age, marital status and household size (xi). The stochastic specication
of our model implies that vm
ij has a generalized extreme value distribution, which gives rise to
the nested logit model. More specically, we dene two nests. The rst nest is a singleton,
containing only location 1 (Ecuador). The second nest contains locations 2 and 3 (the US
and Spain).
7 Results
We estimate a two-equation Roy model for migration and earnings, which allows for un-
observed heterogeneity in individual propensities to migrate that also aects earnings. Our
estimation takes place in two steps, and we compute bootstrapped standard errors to account
for the sequential nature of the estimation.
7.1 Counterfactual earnings
Recall the three main features of our earnings data. First, we use information on annual
earnings of Ecuadorians in each location. Thus we do not need to rely on extrapolation
based on earnings data for the native population. Second, we compute counterfactual after-
tax earnings, by using the income tax schedule in each destination during our period of
analysis. There are important dierences in income tax rates between the three countries.
As illustrated by Figure 4, income taxes are highest in Spain and lowest in Ecuador.27
Third, we are able to include a rich set of individual characteristics, usually not available
in studies that use aggregate data. It is still possible that, even controlling for individual
dierences in observable characteristics, unobserved heterogeneity may bias our predictions
for counterfactual earnings. To address this concern, we produce selection-corrected earnings,
which is feasible thanks to our detailed individual-level information.
Let us now turn to the specication of our earnings equation. We estimate one equation
for each of the three locations, on the sample of employed Ecuadorians who report positive
27For instance, consider an individual earning $20,000. While she would be subject to a marginal tax rate
below 10 percent in Ecuador and in the US the marginal tax rate in Spain would be almost 20 percent. The
dierence in taxation between the US and Spain implies that the gap in after-tax earnings is even larger
than the gap in pre-tax earnings between the two destinations.
21earnings.28 The dependent variable is the log of after-tax annual earnings (in 2005 US
dollars) for Ecuadorians in each respective location. The right-hand side includes a vector of
occupational dummies, a polynomial in age, and dummies for being female, having a college
degree and being married. Including occupational dummies allows for a relatively high
goodness of t, which is important in order to produce rich predictions for counterfactual
earnings. For each country, we estimate two models. The rst model (labeled Mincer)
does not control for self-selection, and amounts to a Mincer regression augmented with
occupational dummies. The second model (labeled Dahl) corrects for self-selection into
migration and employment  a la Dahl (2002), that is, by including a polynomial with the cell
probabilities dened in the implementation section above.
The results are reported in Table 4. Let us start with the Mincer model estimates (odd
data columns). Two observations are worth noting. First, our estimates imply a large college
wage premium in Ecuador (35 percent), compared to the US (around 8 percent) and Spain
(0 percent). We note that the estimates for the US and Spain have high standard errors,
reecting the limited number of observations and the fact that we are including a vector of
occupation dummies, which accounts for most of the variation in earnings. Second, we also
nd a very large female wage penalty in the three countries, although larger in Ecuador (35
percent) than in the US (26 percent) and Spain (27 percent).
We now turn to the Dahl earnings regression models, which correct for self-selection into
employment and migration. The results are reported in the even data columns of Table
4. The main observation is that the estimates are very similar to the ones obtained in
the Mincer models. That is, correcting for self-selection does not seem to make a large
quantitative dierence in the predictions for after-tax earnings, suggesting that our rich set
of observable characteristics captures most of the relevant heterogeneity. There are, however,
reasons to prefer the earnings predictions that correct for self-selection. As the last row in
Table 4 shows, we reject the null of joint zero values of the correction Dahl parameters for
the case of Ecuador (though not for the US and Spain). Thus the next step in the estimation
uses the earnings predictions that correct for selection into employment and migration. As
a robustness check, we also report our main results using earnings predictions based on the
Mincer models.
28We trim 2.5 percent of the observations with the highest and lowest earnings although this does not
signicantly aect the results.
227.2 Location choice
We now turn to the second stage of our estimation procedure, the discrete location-choice
model based on our predicted counterfactual after-tax earnings. In practice it boils down to
estimating a nested logit discrete-choice model and adjusting standard errors to account for
the sequential nature of our estimation procedure.
The deterministic part of the utility associated to each location is assumed to be a function
of (log) after-tax earnings, a country-specic intercept, and a list of individual controls,
including age, age squared, gender, education, marital status and household size. Let us now
briey justify the choice of the variables, besides earnings. The country-specic intercepts
account for dierences in policies, institutions, culture, and cost of living across the three
destinations. The vector of individual controls is meant to capture individual dierences in
the cost of migration. For instance, it is well known that women and individuals who are
older, less educated, and have family ties are less likely to migrate. In particular, we note
that the coecient associated to the education variable captures only the eect operating
through the cost of migration, since we are already controlling for earnings. Following the
usual convention, we normalize to zero the intercept and the coecients of all variables that
do not vary across destinations for the Ecuador alternative.
Table 5 presents our estimates for a number of specications. Column 1 presents our
main results. The main explanatory variable is the log of annual after-tax earnings, which are
counterfactual predictions based on the selection-corrected earnings equation (Dahl model
in Table 4). First, let us focus on the main coecient of interest. The earnings coecient
is positive and highly signicant (0.623), indicating that higher expected earnings at a par-
ticular country increase the probability to locate there. We also note that the bootstrapped
standard errors are relatively small (0.26329). Next, let us examine the robustness of this
estimate across the remaining specications. Column 2 presents the results when we use
the log of pre-tax earnings, which delivers a very similar coecient30. Column 3 presents
the results when we use earnings predictions that do not correct for self-selection (Mincer's
model in Table 4). The estimated coecient is again very similar to the one found in column
1. In column 4 we assume that after-tax earnings enter linearly in the utility associated to
29The unadjusted (no bootstrap) standard error is 0.121.
30Standard errors are much lower than in column 1 because - for all other model specications - we are not
reporting bootstrapped standard errors. Of course, that would be more appropriate but the computation
time is not trivial.
23each location. Again, the estimated coecient is positive and highly signicant. Finally,
we consider a model that assumes no correlation across alternatives in unobservables (con-
ditional logit). As shown in column 5, the point estimate associated to after-tax earnings is
again positive and signicant, and approximately 20 percent larger than in column 1 (0.752),
although the dierence is not statistically signicant. Taken together, these estimates sug-
gest that earnings at destination are a robust determinant of migration choices. We discuss
the magnitude of the eects and the coecients associated to the individual controls below.
A second important observation is that the model with log after-tax earnings (column 1)
appears to be a better specication than the model where earnings enter linearly (column 4).
In particular, the estimated dissimilarity coecient associated to specication 1 is 0.25331,
which implies a within-nest correlation of 0.94. In contrast, specication 4 features a poorly
estimated dissimilarity coecient equal to 59.78, which is inconsistent with random utility
maximization.
We now turn to the estimated coecients of the individual controls. First, we note that
the coecient of the college-graduate dummy is positive but not signicant in our main
specication (column 1). Only in column 5 we nd a positive and marginally signicant
value. That is to say, conditional on expected earnings in each destination, education plays
at most a limited role in shaping international migration decisions. Second, being female is
associated to a lower probability to migrate, especially to the US. The estimated coecients
are signicant and tend to be larger in absolute value than the estimated coecient for
having a college degree. We comment on the estimates of the remaining individual controls
later on, when we provide estimates of the implicit cost of migration.
The low overall level of statistical signicance of the college and female dummies in Table
5 suggest that most of the rich observed patterns of selection and sorting in education in
Ecuadorian migration ows must be generated by variation in expected earnings.
7.3 The marginal eects of changes in earnings
We next report on the magnitude of the eects of changes in earnings on location choice
implied by our parameter estimates. It is helpful to start by exploiting the tractability
of the nested logit model, which provides closed-form solutions for the choice probabilities
31We note that 76 percent of the estimates of this parameter in our bootstrapped replications fall below
1.
24(equations (8) and (9)).
We nd particularly helpful to focus on the elasticity of the choice probabilities to changes




j;k = 1;2;3 (13)
The matrix below collects the whole matrix of elasticities, where element (j;k) in the
matrix corresponds to the percentage change in choice probability pk associated to a one








































which is a function of the dissimilarity parameter . It is important to note that all
elements of the matrix are pre-multiplied by , the coecient on log earnings in the latent
utility equation. Setting the dissimilarity parameter  = 1 delivers the elasticity matrix for
the simpler logit model, which we report further down.
Using our main set of estimates, we compute one matrix of elasticities for each individual,
taking into account his or her individual controls, and then average over the whole sample.












Several points are worth noting. First, elasticities on the main diagonal are all positive
while o-diagonal elements are all negative, as expected since the former are own-elasticities
and the latter are cross-elasticities. Second, the own elasticity for Ecuador (11) is much
smaller than the own elasticities for the US and Spain (respectively, 22 and 33). Namely, a
10 percent increase in Ecuadorian earnings leads to an increase in the probability of staying
in Ecuador equal to 0.4 percent whereas the same percentage increase in expected earnings in
the US is associated to a 20.1 percent increase in the probability of migrating to the US. This
large asymmetry simply captures the fact that most Ecuadorians stayed in Ecuador. Second,
25the elasticity associated to the probability of migrating to the US or Spain in response to a
change in Ecuadorian earnings equals  0:59 for both destinations. We note that 12 and 13
are between-nest cross-elasticities. Third, the within-nest cross-elasticities are also high. In
particular, the elasticity of a change in Spain's earnings on the probability of migrating to
the US (32) equals  1:43, compared to  0:45 for the change in the probability of migrating
to Spain in response to changes in US earnings (23).
It is interesting to compare these elasticities to the ones that we would have obtained
from the estimation of the more restricted conditional logit model. That is, if we had main-
tained unchanged the rst stage of our estimation (the prediction of counterfactual earnings)
but modied the second stage by imposing uncorrelated error terms across locations. This
choice is logically inconsistent in our framework since it recognizes the potential existence of
unobserved heterogeneity in propensities to migrate in the rst stage but ignores it in the
second. Still, we report below the corresponding matrix, based on the estimates of model 5
in Table 5:
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Inspection of the analytic expressions for the elasticities in matrices (14) and (16) reveals
that the rst row and the rst column of the matrices are identical in the conditional and
nested logit models32. As a result, between-nest cross-elasticities are very similar in the
two cases. In contrast, the within-nest cross-elasticities are much smaller when unobserved
heterogeneity in propensities to migrate is ignored (conditional logit). For example, an
increase in expected earnings in Spain equal to one percent leads to a percentage change in
the probability of migrating to the US equal to -0.03 percent according to the conditional
logit estimates, compared to a -1.43 percent in the nested logit. This large discrepancy in
the magnitude of the within-nest cross-eects between the two models is quite intuitive. As
noted earlier, the correlation coecient between the error terms in the nest containing the
US and Spain is quite high (0.94), providing evidence that heterogeneity in propensities to
migrate plays a large role. Among the subset of migrants the mean unobserved propensity
to migrate is above average. As a result, these individuals (the migrant type, so to speak)
are very sensitive to earning dierences across the two potential destinations. As we discuss
32There is a dierence in the estimate of , which happens to be very small empirically in this case.
26in detail below, an increase in expected earnings in one of these destinations, relative to the
other, has a larger inuence in their destination choice than what results from the conditional
logit model.
This nding has important implications for the estimation of the eects of income in de-
termining international migration ows. In studies using aggregate data it is often assumed
that bilateral migration ows from one country to another are a function of the dierence
in expected earnings between those two countries, as implied by the conditional logit model.
However, in the presence of individual heterogeneity in propensities to migrate bilateral
migration ows are a nonlinear function of expected earnings (utilities) in all potential loca-
tions. To see this we use equations (8) and (9) to derive the log ratio of the probability to

















In the absence of unobserved individual heterogeneity in propensities to migrate, the error
terms in the location choice equations are uncorrelated, implying a dissimilarity parameter





= Vj   V1 = x
0j + (wj   w1) (18)
Our estimated dissimilarity coecient is substantially below one (^  = 0:25), implying a
correlation coecient of 0:94 between the error terms in the US and Spain location equations.
Consequently, the predictions of our estimated model dier substantially from those obtained
by assuming away unobserved individual dierences in the propensity to migrate. Consider,
for instance, the implications of a simultaneous 1 percent increase in expected earnings in











= 12   11 + 22   21 (19)
This expression is exactly zero in the logit model, as can be checked easily using the
expressions in equation (16). That is, in a model that ignores unobserved heterogeneity in
propensities to migrate these changes in earnings would not trigger any migration ows from
Ecuador to the US. But this is not the case here. Substituting the values for the elasticities
27from matrix (15), we obtain that the logs ratio increases by 1.39 percent.33 In other words,
a seemingly neutral change in relative earnings leads to an increase in the relative migration
ow to the US. The intuition is that the increase in US expected earnings triggers a shift in
the destination choice of individuals with a high propensity to migrate, who now choose to
migrate to the US rather than to Spain.
It is interesting to compare our marginal eects of earnings to those obtained using
only aggregate data, as in Grogger and Hanson (2008) or Ortega and Peri (2009). The
former estimate a conditional logit, whereas the latter estimate a nested logit model with
the same nested structure as here. Both studies use cross-country data. There are three
main conceptual dierences between our analysis and theirs. First, we use data on actual
earnings of immigrants, rather than imputing them from GDP per capita in the destination
country. Second, our counterfactual expected earnings account for the fact that migrants
are likely to be self-selected. Finally, our discrete choice model allows for correlated errors
across destinations. The estimated coecient for log earnings (proxied by log income per
capita) ranges between 3 and 5 (with standard error around one) in Grogger and Hanson
(2008) and between 0.75 and 0.77 (with standard error around 0.25) in Ortega and Peri
(2009).34 Our estimates of the coecient on log earnings, around 0.6, are lower than in
these two studies although not statistically dierent from those in Ortega and Peri (2009).
An important dierence with the latter study is that lacking individual-level data, Ortega
and Peri (2009) cannot identify the dissimilarity parameter, which plays a crucial role in the
computation of the cross-elasticities.
7.4 Implicit costs of migration
As emphasized in Hanson (2008), the largest gap in the literature on international migration
is the limited understanding of the nature of migration costs. Clearly, these costs go well
beyond the direct costs associated with physically moving from one location to another.
Relevant indirect costs include the psychological costs related to being far away from family
and friends, but also the costs of overcoming barriers to migration. For legal migrants, this
may be the months or years waiting for a visa. For illegal migrants, these indirect costs may
33The reader can check that a simultaneous one percent increase in expected earnings in Ecuador and Spain
leads to an increase of 0.43 percent in the log odds of migrating to Spain relative to staying in Ecuador.
34The coecients are comparable since their models are nested in ours.
28include the consequences of being apprehended while attempting to cross the border or the
probability of being discovered once in the destination country and then deported.35
Understanding what the main dimensions behind migration costs are is key to the anal-
ysis of our specic migration episode. After all, most Ecuadorians stayed in Ecuador and,
among those that migrated, the majority chose to move to Spain even though the US oered
substantially higher earnings opportunities. This implies that overall migration costs are
very high, compared to earnings dierences. Additionally, the perceived cost of migrating
to the US must have been substantially higher than the cost of migrating to Spain.
The goal of this section is to provide estimates of the implicit cost of migration associated
to each of the two destinations. We use our estimated model to produce average estimates
of migration costs by gender and education level. Following the convention in the literature
(Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) or McKenzie and Rapoport (2009), we express these implicit
migration costs in time-equivalent units, as a fraction of Ecuadorian expected earnings.
Suppose, rst, that our migration choice model only included earnings and a country-
specic constant in the right-hand side. In this case, it is straightforward to back out a
measure of the implicit migration cost to each destination. The intercept for, say, Spain is a
measure of the attractiveness of Spain relative to the baseline normalization (Ecuador). On
the basis of equation (1), the units for this variable are \utils". The coecient on expected
earnings provides a scaled measure of the marginal utility of income. Thus, its inverse can be
used to map \utils" into US dollars. Finally, multiplying the implicit attractiveness measure
of each location by minus one we obtain our measure of alternative-specic implicit migration
costs measured in US dollars. We note that, due to our normalization, the implicit migration
cost associated to staying in Ecuador is zero.
Our model is richer than the stylized model described in the previous paragraph. In
particular, it contains several individual characteristics, such as education, gender, age, and
household size. However, the procedure above can be applied to provide measures of implicit
migration costs which, in this case, will vary at the individual level. Table 6 presents our
main results. The rst column reports our estimate of average migration costs to the US
relative to Ecuadorian earnings, disaggregated by gender and education. The second column
presents analogous gures for Spain. Column 3 is the ratio of the previous two columns.
35Using cross-country panel data, Ortega and Peri (2009) empirically show that adopting more restrictive
immigration policies leads to substantially lower actual immigration ows. In our model such a policy shift
would imply higher overall migration costs.
29Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in brackets.
Three features of the table are worth noting. First, net migration costs are higher to
the US than to Spain for all four groups. We nd that the net cost of migrating to the US
for males without a college degree is 8.5 times their Ecuadorian income (9.5 for females).
Second, as expected, the estimated net migration costs are substantially higher for the US
than for Spain: around 30 percent higher for non-college graduates and about twice as high
for college graduates, for both genders. We note that female non-college graduates face the
highest relative costs to the two destinations.
We must point out that net migration costs are clearly negatively related to education in
both countries, as hypothesized by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and McKenzie and Rapoport
(2009) among others. The literature on the determinants of international migration oers a
menu of elements that our estimation method is containing in our so-called net migration
costs in Table 6: immigration policy dierences (Ortega and Peri (2009)), the role of networks
(Beine, Docquier, and  Ozden (2009) or McKenzie and Rapoport (2009)), dierences in access
and generosity in the welfare state (Mayda (2008)), unemployment rates (Clark, Hatton, and
Williamson (2007)), and so on. Our model controls for all of these factors as long as they
are related to the observables in our location choice model but it is silent about which of
them played the main role. Essentially, all these factors are buried in the country-specic
intercepts and coecients on observables.
Having shown that expected earnings matter for migration decisions (Table 5), some
elements in our net migration costs are required to understand why most migrants preferred
the Spanish destination over the US one, despite the much higher expected earnings in the
US. In what follows, we provide an interpretation for what may have been the most likely
determinants of implicit migration costs in our particular migration episode. Our discussion
is based on a comparison of the average implicit migration costs across education and gender
groups from Table 6. In particular, we discuss the roles of dierences in the spread of earlier
ethnic networks, in employment rates, in access to the welfare state and in immigration
policy.
7.4.1 Migrant networks
As explained earlier, Ecuadorian migration to Spain started at the end of the 1990s (Figure
3). In contrast, Ecuadorians had been migrating to the US for several decades. Most of
30the Ecuadorians that had settled in the US came from two poor regions: Ca~ nar and Azuay
(see, for example, Jokisch and Pribilsky (2002) or Bertoli (2010)). Bertoli (2010), using only
Ecuadorian data, shows the relevance of these networks in explaining migration patterns to
the US. Since such long-standing networks were non-existent in Spain, it could be argued
that networks are a factor that should have favored migration to the US over migration
to Spain which, in our estimates, would be reected in lower implicit migration costs for
Ecuadorian emigrants to the US. Since ows were actually much higher to Spain than to the
US, networks actually deepen the puzzle that most migrants chose Spain over the US.
7.4.2 Employment rates
As shown in Table 3, employment rates for males were very similar in the two destinations
at all education levels. However, female employment rates were much higher for Ecuadorian
immigrants in Spain than in the US: around 20 percentage points higher. This would tend
to make Spain a more attractive destination for Ecuadorian emigrants than the US. In
our estimation exercise, this attractiveness is reected as smaller implicit net migration
costs in Table 6. Thus, dierences in employment rates may have been a relevant factor
explaining emigration to Spain for Ecuadorian females but cannot account for the larger
ow of Ecuadorian males to Spain (Table 1).
7.4.3 Welfare state
Another dimension that makes Spain a much more attractive destination for migrants, par-
ticularly if undocumented, than the US is the easy access to public services. In Spain all
residents, regardless of their country of birth or their immigration status, have access to
universal health care and public education. The only requirement is to be registered in the
Local Population Registry. Registration does not require proof of legal status. In addition,
Ecuadorians can benet from a 1960 bilateral agreement between Ecuador and Spain regard-
ing the contributions to the Social Security system. In short, the contributions to Spain's
social security system by Ecuadorians are perfectly portable.36
36In particular, Article 4 of the bilateral agreement states that `When an insured person has worked in
the two countries without completing in either the minimum period of contribution necessary to receive the
invalidity benet and old-age pension provided for under the social security legislation of each country, the
periods of contribution in each country shall be aggregated for the purpose of determining entitlement. The
31The greater generosity and the unrestricted access to Spanish welfare state provisions are
likely to have been relevant factors driving down the implicit migration costs of moving to
Spain rather than to the US. The same holds true for other country specic factors, such as
the lower costs of living in Spain, and the cultural and linguistic proximity between Ecuador
and Spain. In our estimation, this is captured by our Spain-specic intercept.
7.4.4 Immigration Policy and risk of apprehension
Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (2010) have suggested that dierences in
immigration policy may have played a role. In the years between 1999 and 2005, the US
was practically closed to Ecuadorians that wanted to migrate legally unless they could do
so via family reunication. Moreover, Figure 2 suggests that a large fraction of Ecuadorian
migrants to the US during this period may have been forced to migrate illegally, involving a
higher monetary cost and a high risk of apprehension.37 Clearly, taking this risk into account
may have reduced the utility associated to migrating to the US. In contrast, Ecuadorians
that wanted to travel to Spain could do so under a visa waiver program established in
1963.38 And even those that overstayed did not have to bear the high psychological and
economic costs associated to being undocumented migrants in the US. In a context of strong
economic growth, raids and apprehensions within Spain's borders were virtually non-existing.
Moreover, the Spanish government implemented repeated Spanish amnesties (2000, 2001 and
2005; see Figure 3). Thus, it is quite likely that the visa waiver policy played a key role in
accounting for Spain's larger power of attraction. Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and
Ortega (2010) supply a convincing piece of evidence supporting this interpretation. In August
2003, following European Union directions, Spain started requiring visas to Ecuadorians.
These authors show that the inows of Ecuadorians into Spain fell sharply, from almost eight
thousand in the average month over the previous year to less than two thousand individuals
in all months between September 2003 and September 2006. In fact, in years 2004 and 2005
institution to which contributions relating to the most recent period were paid shall grant the benet, the
amount of which shall be the sum of the partial benets authorized by each institution to which the claimant
has contributed and shall reect the percentage of the claimant's contributions, period of contribution and
age.'
37See Bertoli, Fern andez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (2010) for a back of the envelope estimate of this
risk.
38For more details see http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2003/07/04/pdfs/A26025-26025.pdf
32the US became again the main destination for Ecuadorian migrants.
8 Conclusions
This paper presents a version of the Roy-Borjas model where individuals are heterogeneous in
the unobserved propensity to migrate. Using individual-level data on an interesting recent
episode in international migration, we estimate the role of earnings as a determinant of
international migration ows while appropriately accounting for self-selection. Importantly,
our data contains earnings and a set of individual characteristics for stayers (in Ecuador)
and migrants to all relevant destinations (the US and Spain).
Our main nding is that international migration decisions respond to earnings dier-
ences, even in a context where most (Ecuadorian) migrants preferred a relatively low-wage
destination (Spain) over one with higher wages (the US). However, our estimates show that
changes in expected wages at a particular destination have a larger eect on destination
choice conditional on migration than on the overall migration rate. In terms of our model,
the reason for this pattern is that migrants tend to have above-average propensities to mi-
grate. As a result their choices are more sensitive to changes in earnings at a particular
destination than those of the average stayer, characterized by a low propensity to migrate.
This nding has important implications for the empirical literature aiming at the estima-
tion of the determinants of international migration. It implies that models where bilateral
migration ows are assumed to be a function of the dierence in expected earnings between
each pair of locations are misspecied. Our analysis also suggests that factors other than
earnings are crucial determinants of international migration ows.
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Ecuadorian migrants born in 1949-1982 
   Destination    
   US  Spain  Spain/US 
Males 44,410  124,586  2.8 
   (3,035)  (7,455)  (0.3) 
Non-college  37,927 115,069  3.0 
   (2,895) (7,312)  (0.3) 
College  6,183 9,517  1.5 
   (1,030) (1,790)  (0.4) 
           
Females 37,914  121,352  3.2 
   (2,605)  (6,558)  (0.3) 
Non-college  29,705 102,935  3.5 
   (2,342) (6,131)  (0.4) 
College  8,209 18,417  2.2 
   (1,243) (2,699)  (0.5) 
           
Both genders          
Non-college  67,632 218,004  3.2 
   (3,571) (8,909)  (0.2) 
College  14,392 27,934  1.9 
   (1,599) (3,212)  (0.3) 
           
Total  82,024 245,938  3.0 
  (3,788) (9,148)  (0.2) 
 




Ecuadorians in:  Ecuador US  Spain 
    mean std.dev. Mean std.dev. mean std.dev. 
Female  0.52  0.5 0.46 0.5 0.49 0.5 
                   
Males                  
Age at migration  37.99 9.74 28.78 8.42 28.66 7.91 
Years since migration   -    -  5.73 1.99 6.25 1.38 
Share college graduates  0.14  0.35 0.14 0.35 0.08 0.27 
Labor income, 2005 USD  3,565 5,471  26,896  20,344  15,979  4,214 
                   
Females                  
Age at migration  37.97 9.49 30.22 8.54 28.91 7.54 
Years since migration        5.68 1.84 6.07 1.43 
Share college graduates  0.13  0.34 0.22 0.41 0.15 0.36 
Labor income, 2005 USD  1,509 3,147  18,189  12,718  10,767  3,317 
                   







Ecuadorians in:  Ecuador US  Spain 
           
Average employment rates          
           
Non-college graduates          
Males  0.95 0.90 0.90 
Females  0.57 0.63 0.81 
           
College graduates          
Males  0.93 0.92 0.92 
Females  0.81 0.63 0.84 
           
College/non-college          
Males  0.98 1.03 1.02 
Females  1.43 1.00 1.04 
           
Males/females          
Non-college  1.67 1.43 1.11 
College  1.14 1.47 1.10 
           
Median earnings (2005 USD)          
           
Non-college graduates          
Males 2,304  21,440  15,431 
Females 1,560  14,865  10,521 
           
College graduates          
Males 6,000  30,492  15,431 
Females 4,392  20,582  10,942 
           
College/non-college          
Males  2.60 1.42 1.00 
Females  2.82 1.38 1.04 
           
Males/females          
Non-college  1.48 1.44 1.47 







Country  Ecuador  Ecuador US  US  Spain Spain 
Spec.  Mincer Dahl Mincer Dahl Mincer Dahl 
                    
College graduate  0.351 0.308 0.081 0.220 -0.009  -0.070 
   [0.028]*** [0.030]***  [0.088]  [4.456] [0.025] [0.558] 
Female  -0.354 -0.256 -0.257 0.133 -0.274 -0.002 
   [0.015]*** [0.034]*** [0.069]***  [33.832] [0.028]***  [5.947] 
Age  0.013 0.011 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 
   [0.003]*** [0.003]***  [0.014]  [0.015] [0.005] [0.005] 
Age squared  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   [0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Married  0.126 0.144 0.023 0.036 -0.034  -0.031 
   [0.014]*** [0.015]***  [0.065]  [0.072] [0.021] [0.023] 
                    
Managers  1.089 1.089 0.358 0.398 -0.180  -0.194 
   [0.036]*** [0.037]***  [0.183]*  [0.207]** [0.030]***  [0.148] 
Professionals  0.841 0.837 0.539 0.571 0.026 0.037 
   [0.035]*** [0.035]***  [0.278]*  [0.279]** [0.149]  [0.176] 
Technicians  0.794 0.792 0.117 0.111 -0.094  -0.059 
   [0.031]*** [0.032]***  [0.188]  [0.202] [0.072] [0.080] 
Clerical support  0.785 0.786 0.196 0.210 0.084 0.082 
   [0.033]*** [0.034]***  [0.123]  [0.129]* [0.054] [0.058] 
Service and sales  0.398 0.401 -0.011 -0.006 0.043 0.039 
   [0.021]*** [0.021]***  [0.088]  [0.099] [0.035] [0.035] 
Skilled agriculture  -0.263 -0.264 -0.308 -0.315 -0.004 0.009 
   [0.021]*** [0.021]***  [0.231]  [0.281] [0.080] [0.078] 
Craft, rel. trade  0.260 0.258 0.249 0.255 0.084 0.083 
   [0.022]*** [0.021]*** [0.088]*** [0.094]*** [0.028]*** [0.028]*** 
Plant, mach. oper.  0.523 0.517 0.238 0.223 0.096 0.105 
   [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.091]*** [0.097]*** [0.031]*** [0.035]*** 
Constant  7.282 6.856 9.738  13.639  9.391 9.881 
    [0.022]*** [0.160]*** [0.123]*** [164.603] [0.047]*** [30.088]* 
                    
R2  0.32 0.32 0.16 0.17 0.37 0.38 
Observations 18423  18423  320 320 716 716 
F test Dahl pvalue  n.a.  0.00 n.a. 0.72 n.a. 0.20 
 









   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
Specification Main  No  tax  Mincer  Linear  Logit 
Tax-adjusted earnings  yes  no  yes  yes  yes 
Prediction earnings  Dahl  Dahl  Mincer  Dahl  Dahl 
                 
                 
Log earnings  0.623  0.659  0.592     0.752 
   [0.263]***  [0.124]***  [0.121]***     [0.187]*** 
Earnings           0.496    
            [0.054]***    
United States                
College 0.093  0.113  0.065  -2.883  0.368 
   [1.428]  [0.146]  [0.147]  [8.066]  [0.183]* 
Female -0.171  -0.161  -0.176  -2.259  -0.282 
   [2.205]*  [0.076]**  [0.076]**  [5.075]  [0.128]** 
Spain                
College 0.074  0.098  0.05  0.945  0.109 
   [0.564]  [0.159]  [0.156]  [2.218]  [0.225] 
Female -0.165  -0.138  -0.164  2.436  -0.152 
   [0.781]  [0.078]*  [0.079]**  [1.415]*  [0.095] 
Number cases  29546  29546  29546  29546  29546 
Dissimilarity coefficient  0.253  0.295  0.247  59.783  1 
s.e. [20.912]  [0.101]  [0.091] [141.187]     
Share in (0,1]  0.76             
US-Spain correlation  0.936 0.913  0.939 n.a.  0 




controls  for  age,  age  squared,  marital  status,  household  size,  and  a  country‐specific 









Group  US Spain  US/Spain 
Male, non-college grad.  8.5  6.5  1.3 
    [0.6] [0.2] [0.1] 
Male, college grad.  5.4  2.7  2.0 
    [1.0] [0.2] [0.4] 
Female, non-college grad.  9.5  7.2  1.3 
    [0.9] [0.2] [0.1] 
Female, college grad.  5.4  3.1  1.7 
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Source:  authors’  elaboration  on  ENI  2007  and  Spanish  Ministry  of  Work  and 
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Figure 4. Income tax schedules in Ecuador, the US and Spain. 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration from the OECD Tax Database and Servicio de Rentas 
Internas in Ecuador 
 